War Talk: The Obama Administration and Iran

“Let there be no doubt,” President Obama declared in his 2012 State of the Union address. “America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal.” The comment drew a rousing and sustained standing ovation from the US Congress. “But a peaceful resolution of this issue is still possible,” the President continued to a smattering of applause that tumbled awkwardly across the silent chamber. The spectacle would suggest war on Iran seems not just a viable but perhaps even a highly popular prospect on Capital Hill.

War talk holds a certain appeal. For an American president facing a difficult re-election campaign, war talk is shorthand for personal resolve and strength. It signals support for the military at a time when cuts to defense are essential. It crosses deep partisan divides in Washington, however momentarily. War talk helps push China and Russia to support crippling sanctions they have long resisted; rather than punishing Iran, the sanctions can now be posited as an attempt to stave off impending war on Iran which they oppose. And war talk reassures Israel’s Likud leadership that they wield enormous influence over American policy-making.

The Military Option

Every US president since Jimmy Carter has kept the military option on Iran on the table. Indeed, some US presidents have used the American military as a direct tool in dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 1980, President Carter famously carried out a failed rescue mission of America’s hostages. “The mission was a complete disaster,” concludes Charles Tustin Kamps, a professor of war games at Air Command and State College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. The image of American military helicopters crashed in the Iranian desert appears on a postage stamp of the Islamic Republic, which recalls it as the “defeat of the direct American military attack to Iran.”

In 1994, President Clinton dubbed Iran “a rogue state.” The following year, he declared “a national emergency,” imposing comprehensive trade and financial sanctions on Iran with Executive Order 12957 which began:

“I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the actions and policies of the Government of Iran constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.”

In 2008, Seymour Hersh, a preeminent investigative journalist, warned of a secret war on Iran, arguing, “President Bush’s ultimate goal in the nuclear confrontation with Iran is regime change.” The latest calls for war on Iran grew louder when a mid-level Iranian official recently renewed a perennial Iranian threat to close off the Straits of Hormuz. A highly knowledgeable analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman, concluded that, at best, Iran could close the Straits for “a few days to two weeks.” Iran would do so, Cordesman argued, knowing it would sacrifice all of its military assets in the Gulf, “suffer massive retaliation, and potentially lose many of its own oil facilities and export revenues.” After all, the closure of the Straits would devastate Iran’s already ailing economy. But war talk diffuses the impact of such logical, knowledgeable assessments.

Last week, the US aircraft carrier named the Abraham Lincoln returned to the Fifth Fleet in Persian Gulf. Its presence ensures that the Straits of Hormuz remain open, and it reminds the Iranian regime that a devastating attack with Tomahawk missiles is feasible. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Abraham Lincoln launched 16,500 sorties over Iraq and Afghanistan. The maneuver strengthens the hand of hawks who argue for a strong US military presence in the Gulf even after the United States has withdrawn from Iraq. War talk serves as a powerful counterpoint to those, like Toby Craig Jones, who persuasively argue the presence of the Fifth Fleet confounds US diplomatic options in Bahrain and beyond.

And like the Reagan era, President Obama’s war talk is carefully calibrated to be multi-lateral. It embraces not just traditional US allies in the Middle East, but also those in Europe. This week, European Union ministers in Brussels agreed on an oil embargo of the Islamic Republic. Heading into his 2012 re-election campaign, President Obama hopes to count a strong response to Iran among his diplomatic successes. During his State of the Union address, with Secretary of State Clinton nodding her approval from the audience, President Obama told the US Congress:

“Through the power of our diplomacy, a world that was once divided about how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program now stands as one. The regime is more isolated than ever before; its leaders are faced with crippling sanctions, and as long as they shirk their responsibilities, this pressure will not relent.”

It would seem that Obama’s war talk is designed to isolate Iran diplomatically, damage its economy, and threaten to destabilize the regime. A chastised Islamic Republic, it is assumed, will likely bend to American pressures to stop its nuclear program. The good diplomacy of which President Obama is rightly proud could be put to good use by calling on all parties, including saber rattling allies, to back down from rhetoric hostilities and covert operations that are escalating the threat of war with Iran.

Moving Beyond War talk

One of the dangers of war talk is that it creates a highly volatile atmosphere in which logic and history are pushed aside. As we have seen, the threat of war with Iran has been a cyclical feature of the American political landscape. Since 1979, various triggers have renewed war talk, setting into place reactions against it. Op-eds calling for cool heads to prevail are written. Roundtables of Iran experts are convened at universities. Petitions are circulated, protests are staged. It would be good for Obama’s advisors to recall the limits of war talk which, in the past, has not succeeded in bowing the Islamic Republic or in producing regime change.

The underlying premise of much of the latest wave of war talk is that the Obama administration has two bad choices to make: go to war with Iran or let the Islamic Republic of Iran develop nuclear weapons. This false binary is based on the false premise that we have irrefutable, actionable evidence that Iran is indeed developing nuclear weapons—and that it is close to achieving such a goal. The latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Report is hardly definitive. This assumption also overlooks the critical importance of nuanced diplomacy based on historical, political, and cultural knowledge of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton would do well to remember that the Iranian regime has a proven record of withstanding protracted war. Indeed many of its coercive and propagandistic instruments of power were created during the eight years of war with Iraq in the 1980s. Those networks of power remain at the regime’s disposal today. It is highly doubtful that the military option will bring about regime change. Those who look to the examples of the fall of Muammar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein to the ravages of war should also bear in mind that their regimes were not replaced by governments that ensure regional security or domestic freedoms.

Obama and Netanayu’s Push for Attack on Iran

In determining the best available foreign policy options, the Obama administration should be cautious of those who align US policy with that of its allies. Saudi Arabia and Israel each have long, complicated histories with Iran. Seeing a war on Iran through these lenses might leave the United States with only bad options. President Obama can show genuine leadership by decoupling American policy on Iran from its relationship with Israel.

And although Iran is diplomatically isolated, a military strike against Iran by the United States and/or its allies will likely unite world opinion behind Iran regardless of how unpopular its regime may seem. Iranian history shows time and again that in the face of foreign aggression, Iranians rally behind their flag, regardless of how unpopular or repressive the government may be.

Even Iranian-Americans, whose political views on Iran diverge significantly, stand united against a war, especially after having witnessed the disastrous impact of the war on Iraq.

This article is part of a longer one that first appeared on the Jadaliyya website. It was republished here with special permission. You can read the full article here.