New RCMP Public Complaints Commission Legislation Tabled

Michael Larsen. Published on June 16, 2010

In a June 14 press conference, Public Safety Minister Vic Toews announced the introduction of new legislation that would create an arms-length civilian public complaints commission for the RCMP. The first reading version of the bill, formally entitled ‘An Act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts’, or C-38, is available online.

RCMP accountability reform has been a long time coming. There have been two broad models in circulation for several years: Commissioner O’Connor’s 2006 recommendations at the conclusion of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar and the 2007 Report of the Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change. The two reports sketched out models for a new RCMP accountability body, with the former devoting attention to accountability gaps created by the Force’s collaborative national security activities and the latter focusing on RCMP management and relations with government following a pension scandal. This week’s proposed Commission model is based on the ‘Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP’ proposed by the 2007 Task Force.

Accordingly, the legislation does not include any provisions for reforms aimed at addressing the specific concerns raised by Commissioner O’Connor at the conclusion of his investigation. In particular, the new Commission model does not include measures that would recognize the complex and integrated (interagency, intergovernmental, and transnational) environment in which the RCMP conducts its national security operations. Commissioner O’Connor specifically highlighted the importance of pairing a revised RCMP review and complaints mechanism with a supra-agency coordinating body capable of facilitating information exchanges and joint reviews between an RCMP review body, CSIS’ review body SIRC, and the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment.

This would have been a step towards bringing accountability and oversight capacities in line with collaborative operations. As it stands, it appears that the Government of Canada has dismissed O’Connor’s concerns in favour of a Commission model that does not acknowledge the RCMP’s growing role as a national security police force. The Globe and Mail picked up on this problem in a recent editorial.

As envisioned in the draft legislation, the new ‘RCMP Review and Complaints Commission’ would be a civilian body with a range of review powers and jurisdiction over the RCMP’s federal and contract policing activities (though it would defer to provincial or regional SIU-type bodies or commissions where possible, and where such bodies exist).

The Commission would not report directly to Parliament, but would instead deliver its (non-binding) reports to the Minister of Public Safety and the Commissioner of the RCMP. Additionally, the Complaints Commissioner would only be able to self-initiate an investigation after first seeking Ministerial approval, raising obvious and serious questions about the limits of the Commission’s status as an independent body, as noted by former RCMP Public Complaints Commissioner Paul Kennedy.

The Commission would have, “for the purpose of conducting [...] reviews and for conducting investigations and hearings into individual conduct, a new right of access to information, other than cabinet confidences, that is under the control of the Force or in its possession”, and the powers of a superior court to compel oral and written evidence when investigating a complaint. A substantial section of the Act deals with the ability of the Commission to access information of a privileged or sensitive nature, and sets out a procedure for appointing a retired judge to vet such information and make report to the Minister of Public Safety with regards to the merits of its release to the Commission, in situations where the RCMP decides to deny access.

At first glance, then, it seems reasonable to question both the independence of this new Commission and its ability to effectively review the RCMP’s national security activities and other integrated operations. The history of the RCMP since the 1970s has been fraught with examples of misconduct associated with its ‘high policing’ functions (in short, the policing of national security), from ‘dirty tricks’ and excessive use of force, through to the Force’s involvement in rendition and torture activities.

When such activities come to light, they present the government of the day with an embarrassing scandal to be managed, or, preferably, avoided altogether – particularly when the activities in question have involved political direction or cooperation with foreign partners.

Ultimately, it is disingenuous to suggest that a new era of RCMP accountability could begin with the creation of a review and complaints body that must seek the approval of a Minister and member of cabinet before it can self-initiate a review.