Death with dignity

Countries have always honoured those who fall in battle, and funeral orations have always found honoured places in ancient as well as recent history.  In Athens, Pericles’ speech is remembered not only for its language honouring the dead, but also honoured as an “eulogy for Athens itself.” Twenty-two hundred years later, Abraham Lincoln, in his sparse, evocative Gettysburg Address did much the same; honouring the dead from battle while sounding a clarion call for human equality and “a new birth of freedom.” They used simplicity of language shorn of exaggeration and pomposity to memorialize those who died and the deep debt owed them by fellow citizens.  Service, duty and honour are used with grace and in the attending military protocol the precision surrounds these ceremonies with dignity and solemnity.

Canadians have seen these ceremonies with some regularity since 2002.  Unlike early efforts by the government to shield Canadians from the reality of these deaths on foreign battlefields, the more recent very public ceremonies honour those who fall.  At the same time, their very regularity has eroded the legitimacy of the war in Afghanistan.

The response of Canadians to these deaths demonstrates, for many, that we have asked much from hundreds of Canadian families.  In doing so we seek to make amends for the terrible price a few pay.  Equally, in doing so, we provide a collective apology for these personal tragedies.

The history of the Afghan war is yet to be written.  Its torturous Canadian path, however, is already well known, especially the roles played by senior politicians and generals. The Chrétien-to-Martin-to-Harper triple play wins no plaudits away from the baseball diamond.  The missteps of all three, along with the inept performances of their close colleagues, already provide hard lessons for those who casually decide Canadian citizens be sent to foreign lands to die. In a time of war to have seen eight foreign ministers and seven defence ministers strongly demonstrates a dysfunctional political system at a time when deaths on the battlefield demands a unity of national purpose.

Looking back over the past eight years of the Afghan debacle, what is surprising is how little thought,  consideration, or attention was given by Canadian leaders to the consequences of sending Canadians to Afghanistan.  For Jean Chrétien it was to show solidarity with the United States at the time of their intense national tragedy.  By the time he shamelessly sneaked out of office and Paul Martin was in charge, the issue was one of recalibrating Canadian foreign and defence policy to demonstrate a new and modern man was in charge.  When he was found to be neither new nor modern and Stephen Harper emerged from an indecisive election it was time to wrap the Afghan effort into the flag of national pride.  Canadians did not “cut and run” in the face of adversity and Afghanistan was seen as such a place rather than as a place where there were people who also did not “cut and run” in the face of invasion and external domination.

The initial support for the United States following the attacks of September 11, 2001 was understandable.  It was a despicable attack and one against which people everywhere could find common cause.  Support for the United States was seen as a responsibility of membership in the family of nations.  However, tragedies no matter how large do not call for an abdication of careful assessment, understanding and some measure of future foretelling.

The initial stages of Canadian involvement in the overthrow of the Afghan government were closely attuned to Canadian capabilities.  Finite and limited military deployments were the order.  However, “victory accomplished” in Afghanistan was declared far too early and the worms of the current tragedy were soon apparent.  The detainee issue first appeared in late December 2001 when photos were published in Canadian papers of Canadian troops with Afghan prisoners.  The Minister of National Defence of the day appeared to be as surprised as most Canadians that Canadian soldiers were already active on the ground and engaged in the war. In the intervening years the detainee issue remains unresolved and provides a dramatic example of national leaders creaming the issue without being willing to engage in the detail work clearly necessary.

Equally, the lack of appropriate equipment for the Canadian forces has added immeasurably to Canadian casualties.  Again, Canadian leaders did no measurement of Canadian capabilities in light of the demands of the Afghan environment.  Hubris rather than planning, dominated at the political level.  Nowhere was this more evident than the lack of Canadian heavy lift helicopters to support the troops.  In the early years when the operations were finite and the serious fighting was still ahead this oversight was less apparent.  However, with the acceptance of a combat role for Canadian troops in late 2005, dedicated helicopters should have been a precondition for the deployment of the combat mission to Kandahar.  The ensuing casualties from the tragically misnamed “improvised explosive devices” should have been expected and a serious effort made to provide helicopter support from the first days of the mission.  Rather the only thing “improvised” was the planning for the mission.

Nowhere is the debacle more acute than in the demands the country has imposed on a small military force.  Canadians and their governments have not seen its military as an important element in our national consciousness.  Again we have creamed the benefits from various international deployments, largely peacekeeping ones, and blithely believed that all  conflicts were equal.  There was a national expectation that large rewards could  be bought with small costs.

Not since the days of Korea when the Canadian military still relatively large in the aftermath of the Second World War, has it had to face a determined and capable enemy.  The combat mission to Kandahar now in its fourth year has eroded and depleted the capabilities of the men and women of the Canadian military. Hopefully, it has also provided civilian leaders with a lesson in the limitations of the military.  As many have noted the decision to go to war is a relatively easy one; it is the getting out when there is little evidence of success that is difficult.

In all of this political and military leaders were content to bask in the glory of soldiers marching off to war and to the demand for solemnity and ceremony when many came home as the casualties of the war. Unfortunately, the sad history so far shows absolutely no willingness to examine either the objectives of the mission or its cost.  In facing the difficulties of the mission, political and military leaders alike, have been quick with the promises of cake tomorrow but not today.

Even the language of the war undervalued the seriousness and the danger of the conflict.  “Improvised explosive device” has joined our everyday language and despite its effectiveness in killing more than 100 Canadian soldiers and hundreds more from allies, its continued currency reflects a sorry state of mind in our understanding.  It illustrates the effort to reduce the capabilities and seriousness of the enemy and in doing so has given false hope about the war.  These IEDs are improvised only in comparison to those produced by Boeing or General Dynamics.  On the Afghan battlefields they are more effective than the B-52 or Warthogs.

Equally, the characterization of the enemy as “scumbags and murderers” by the then Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier were throw away lines aimed at misinforming Canadians and mischaracterizing the war. The General could have spent his time fighting the important battles in support of his troops, than in appealing to the cheap seats of Canadian politics.

So today as  the apparent end of the Kandahar mission approaches in 2011, there are already suggestions that we now have a military well experienced in the supposedly new world of counter insurgency.  The jingoists among us are already suggesting that after an appropriate period of recuperation, this experienced force will be available for duty in other trouble spots where failing and failed states cause concern.  For those who believe that, there are orange groves available for purchase in Labrador.

The Afghan experience has been a searing one.  To believe that is portends anything about future Canadian combat missions is without foundation.  Fortunately, as the recent ceremonies at Trenton and the thousands of Canadians who crowd the overpasses on the 401 demonstrate, Canadians understand the sad direct costs of this mission to many Canadians. Hopefully, they will also remember that the debacle in Afghanistan has many authors and perhaps before long we can have a national debate even a national understanding on the role of the Canadian military.  That debate should be more substantial than whether the military can respond to natural disasters.  Rather the purpose of a Canadian military and its role beyond the shores of Canada should be detailed and some guiding principles established for those who thoughtlessly lead us into tragedies abroad.  That would be an appropriate memorialisation for those who took their last breathe in Afghanistan.